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I. INTRODUCTION
While enjoying a home-cooked meal with his family, a father goes
around the dinner table asking each family member about their day. His
eldest son, a junior at the local high school, answers by going through
some of the mundane details of his day, before beginning to complain
about his chemistry class and his terrible teacher. The son then
exclaims, “My teacher is a dick! He doesn’t know how to teach. He is a
fat ass who just sits in his chair and tells us to read the textbook when
we have questions.”
While the language used in the son’s statement is objectionable and
likely inappropriate for the dinner table, no school would believe that
they have a right to regulate this private family conversation. But what
happens when, later that night, the student uses his home computer to
access the internet and make similar comments on his personal webpage
while also suggesting that students protest at school to get the teacher
fired? Although the student’s speech occurred in a private setting off
campus, the internet speech is transferrable and could end up reaching
the school. The issue that arises in such a situation relates to the
school’s authority, if any, to regulate this type of student internet speech.
The internet is at the frontier of legal analysis and has become a
source of legal confusion. 1 Courts have been perplexed as they attempt
to apply the First Amendment’s protection of free speech to the
internet. 2 As a borderless medium, the internet does not fit conveniently
into traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. 3 This confusion
1. Louis John Seminski, Jr., Note, Tinkering with Student Free Speech: The Internet and the
Need for a New Standard, 33 R UTGERS L.J. 165, 173 (2001) (“With the advent of the Internet, many
new free speech issues have come to the forefront of legal analysis.”).
2. Id. (“The Internet, however, because of its unique ‘electronic’ nature, does not fit neatly into
First Amendment precedent regarding free speech or free press. The Internet exists in cyberspace,
unlike the tangible material world that we live in, which presents many problems in comparing the
mediums and using traditional language.” (citation omitted)); see also J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863 (Pa. 2002) (“[T]he advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of
restrictions on speech.”).
3. Sandy S. Li, Comment, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued Threat to
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becomes almost insurmountable when the internet is considered in the
context of a school environment and the traditional student speech
analysis. 4 Despite this confusion, “[t]he First Amendment protection of
freedom of expression may not be made a casualty of the effort to forcefeed good manners to the ruffians among us.” 5
This Comment addresses the problem created when the traditional
student speech analysis is applied to student internet speech. Part II of
this Comment establishes the basic framework used to allow public
schools to regulate student speech. Part II also discusses the public
schools’ ability to regulate speech that is unprotected by the First
Amendment as well as the framework developed by the Supreme Court
to deal with student speech occurring within the school setting. Part III
deals with internet speech and the various means the lower courts use to
determine when schools can punish students for off-campus internet
speech.
Part IV of this Comment discusses the problems associated with the
lower court jurisprudence as well as the solutions proposed by other
scholars. Part IV then suggests that the on-campus/off-campus
dichotomy should not determine a public school’s ability to regulate
internet speech, but should instead be employed to determine which
analysis to use. Part IV further argues that if internet speech can be
considered on-campus speech, the Supreme Court’s traditional student
speech framework applies, but if the internet speech is considered offcampus, courts should use a balancing test to weigh the student’s interest
in free speech against the school’s interest in regulating that speech.
Part V concludes that while the new standard appears to broaden the
public school’s ability to regulate internet speech, the new standard
actually promotes intellectual honesty, creating an atmosphere that is
more protective of student speech.

Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY . L.A. ENT . L. R EV . 65, 93 (2005) (“The Internet differs from
other traditional mediums of expression, such as flyers, newspapers, and public speeches, for several
reasons: (1) it is pervasive, (2) it allows users to disseminate information to millions of people
immediately and easily, and (3) it can be accessed anywhere.”).
4. See Seminski, supra note 1, at 173 (“Adding the school context into the spin only
complicates matters further.”); see also Caitlin May, Comment, “Internet-Savvy Students” and
Bewildered Educators: Student Internet Speech is Creating New Legal Issues for the Educational
Community, 58 C ATH . U.L. R EV . 1105, 1106 (2009) (“[T]he Internet complicates the traditional student
speech analysis.”).
5. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND A STUDENT’S RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
The First Amendment states “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 6 Despite this language, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that some categories of
expression are not protected by the First Amendment. 7 By carving out
categories of unprotected speech, the Court has recognized that the harm
caused by some forms of speech justify society’s restriction of such
speech. 8 State actors can prevent and punish these limited categories of
speech—including obscenity, fighting words, and true threats—without
raising a constitutional problem. 9
As state actors, public schools may punish student speech that falls
into one of the unprotected categories of speech. In addition, the
Supreme Court has recognized that in light of the “special characteristics
of the school environment,” public schools must also be able to punish
certain types of student speech. 10 With these special circumstances in
mind, the Court has developed four situations where the school’s
interests outweigh the student’s interest in free speech. The remainder
of this Part elaborates on the development of these situations.
A. Tinker: Substantial Disruption and Material Interference
In the seminal student speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 11 the Supreme Court expressly stated that
“students or teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 12 In Tinker, a group of
students wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War. 13
Upon learning of the plan to wear armbands, the school district’s
principals instituted a new school policy: any students wearing an
armband would be asked to remove it, and any students refusing to take
off the armband would be suspended until they returned to school

6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. JEROME A. BARRON, C. THOMAS DIENES, WAYNE MCCORMACK, & MARTIN REDISH,
C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW : P RINCIPLES AND P OLICY , C ASES AND MATERIALS 957 (7th ed. 2006).
8. Id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“It has been well
observed that such utterances [fighting words] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
9. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
10. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 504.
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without wearing the armband. 14 Under this policy, a group of students
were suspended. 15 The students brought suit, seeking an injunction
restraining the school district and its officials from pursuing disciplinary
actions. 16
In Tinker, the Supreme Court indicated that states and school officials
have the authority “to prescribe and control conduct in the schools” so
long as the exercise of power is consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards. 17 Recognizing the applicability of the First
Amendment because the armbands were symbolic speech, 18 the Court
held that teachers and students do not lose their constitutional rights
when entering the schoolhouse, but these rights must be “applied in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment.” 19 The Court
stated that a school district must be able to demonstrate that the
suppression of a student’s opinion is based on reasons other than
avoiding the discomfort that accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the prohibition of expression of
one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to
avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.” 20
Turning to the situation at issue, the Court decided that “the record
[did] not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school
premises in fact occurred” as a result of the armbands. 21 Because the
student speech at issue did not create a substantial disruption or material
interference with schoolwork or discipline, the Court concluded that the
school district’s disciplinary actions were unconstitutional and remanded
the case to the lower courts to determine an adequate form of relief. 22

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 507.
18. Id. at 505–06.
19. Id. at 506.
20. Id. at 511.
21. Id. at 514. The Court indicated that hostile comments made to the students outside of the
classroom did not support a finding that the armbands substantially disrupted schoolwork or discipline.
Id. at 509 (“[O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students. Even an official memorandum
prepared after the suspension that listed the reasons for the ban on wearing the armbands made no
reference to the anticipation of such disruption.”).
22. Id. at 514.
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B. Bethel School District: Vulgar, Lewd, and Plainly Offensive Speech
Tinker’s substantial disruption and material interference analysis
served as the test for determining whether a student’s speech was
constitutionally protected until the Court’s decision in Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser. 23 In Bethel, the Court was called upon “to
decide whether the First Amendment prevents a school district from
disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school
assembly.” 24 At a school assembly, Fraser used graphic and explicit
sexual metaphor in a speech nominating another student for an elective
office. 25 As a result, the school’s assistant principal suspended Fraser
for three days and removed him from the list of potential
commencement speakers. 26 Fraser therefore filed suit, alleging that the
school district’s disciplinary actions violated his right to freedom of
speech. 27
In its decision in Bethel, the Supreme Court created an exception to
the applicability of Tinker, upholding the school district’s sanctions
because “[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.” 28 The Court
reaffirmed that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.” 29 In recognizing a school’s ability to prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive language, the Court considered the traditional role
public schools play in instilling in children the habits and manners of
civility and preparing them to play a role in a democratic society. 30 The
Court concluded that “it was perfectly appropriate for the school to
23. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
24. Id. at 677.
25. Id. at 677–78. Fraser’s speech included the following statements, which were deemed
inappropriate by the school: “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his
character is firm but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm[;]” “Jeff Kuhlman is
a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He
doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds[;]” “Jeff
is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you[;]” “So vote for
Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school can be.” Id.
at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
26. Id. at 678. “A Bethel High School disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene language
in the school provides: ‘Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.’” Id.
27. Id. at 679.
28. Id. at 685. “The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.” Id. at 683.
29. Id. at 682.
30. Id. at 681.
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disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and
lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of
public school education.” 31
C. Hazelwood School District: School-Sponsored Speech
Two years after Bethel permitted schools to prohibit lewd, offensive,
and vulgar speech, the Court created a second exception to Tinker in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 32 In Hazelwood, the school’s
principal removed two pages from an edition of the school newspaper
published by the journalism class because he objected to two of the
articles. 33 Following this decision, three student-members of the school
newspaper brought suit. 34
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that the school newspaper was
not a public forum because “[s]chool officials did not evince either ‘by
policy or by practice’ any intent to open the pages of [the newspaper] to
‘indiscriminate use’ by its student reporters and editors, or by the student
body generally.” 35 The Court’s conclusion that the school newspaper
was not a public forum 36 allowed school officials to regulate the content
of the paper in any reasonable manner. 37
After concluding that the school newspaper was not a public forum,
the Court indicated that schools are not required to affirmatively
promote particular student speech that occurs during “activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school,” as these events may be
characterized as part of the curriculum. 38 When speech bears the
31. Id. at 685–86. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan indicated that “[i]f
respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been
penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.” Id. at 688
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
32. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
33. Id. at 262–64.
34. Id. at 262, 264.
35. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
36. “First Amendment public forum analysis is a judicial doctrine balancing the public’s free
speech interests against the government’s proprietary interests over public property.” Gary E.
Newberry, Note, Constitutional Law: International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is
the Public Forum a Closed Category?, 46 OKLA . L. R EV . 155, 155 (1993). A traditional public forum
exists where speech occurs “on government property that has traditionally been available for public
expression.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). See 1
R ONNA G REFF S CHNEIDER , E DUCATION L AW: F IRST A MENDMENT , DUE P ROCESS AND
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2.4 (1st ed. Supp. 2009) for a general discussion of the forum analysis
and how forum analysis applies in the school setting.
37. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
38. Id. at 270–71. The Court stated that activities may be considered to bear the imprimatur of
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imprimatur of the school, educators can regulate student speech if the
regulation is reasonably related to the school’s legitimate pedagogical
concerns. 39
In applying its new test, the Court concluded that the principal’s
decision not to publish the two articles and the pages containing those
articles did not violate the students’ First Amendment rights. 40 The
school newspaper bore the imprimatur of the school because it was part
of the journalism class curriculum and the Board of Education allocated
funds for it. 41 Since the newspaper bore the imprimatur of the school,
the principal could regulate its contents pursuant to the school’s
legitimate pedagogical concerns.
D. Morse: Speech Promoting Illegal Drug Use
The Court created a third exception to Tinker in Morse v. Frederick. 42
In Morse, a student and his friends displayed a banner stating “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS” during the Olympic Torch Relay. 43 Upon seeing the
banner, the principal demanded that it be taken down because it violated
a school policy prohibiting expression advocating the use of substances
illegal to minors. 44 After Frederick, a student, refused to comply with
the principal’s request, the principal confiscated the banner and
suspended Frederick for ten days. 45 Subsequently, Frederick filed suit.
In Morse, the Supreme Court created a third exception to Tinker,
concluding that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment,
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.” 46 Both the Court and Congress 47
the school and thus be part of the school curriculum, “whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.” Id.
39. Id. at 273.
40. Id. at 276.
41. See id. at 262–63.
42. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
43. Id. at 397.
44. Id. at 398.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 403.
47. As the Court noted:
Congress has declared that part of a school’s job is educating students about the
dangers of illegal drug use. It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local
drug-prevention programs, and required that schools receiving federal funds under the
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 certify that their drugprevention programs “convey a clear and consistent message that . . . the illegal use of
drugs [is] wrong and harmful.”
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recognized the state has a compelling interest in deterring drug use by
students and “part of a school’s job is educating students about the
dangers of illegal drug use.” 48 Because preventing student drug use is
part of the school’s mission, “[s]tudent speech celebrating illegal drug
use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and
teachers, thus poses a particular challenge for school officials working to
protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.” 49
Justice Alito’s concurrence is a key limiting vote 50 in the Morse
decision: he joined the majority’s opinion
on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a public
school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as
advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on
any political or social issue, including speech on issues such as “the
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal
use.” 51

In addressing Frederick’s case, the Court first determined that the
banner constituted on-campus speech because it occurred during school
hours, at an event sanctioned by the school, where teachers and
administrators supervised the students. 52 The Court then examined the
cryptic message on the banner and concluded that it was reasonable for
the principal to interpret the message as promoting illegal drug use. 53
Under the new test, because Frederick’s speech could be reasonably
construed as promoting illegal drug use, the Court held that the
Id. at 408 (internal citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 408.
50. See Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., A Foot in the Door? The Unwitting Move Towards a “New”
Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 A M. U.L. R EV . 1221, 1226
(2009) (“Perhaps even more telling than the majority opinion is the Alito and Kennedy concurrence in
Morse.”); see also Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2007) (referring to
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion as “controlling”). But see Nuxoll ex. rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie
Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (Justices Alito and Kennedy “joined the majority
opinion, not just the decision, and by doing so they made it a majority opinion” not a plurality opinion).
51. Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 400–01 (majority opinion).
53. Id. at 401–02.
At least two interpretations of the words on the banner demonstrate that the sign
advocated the use of illegal drugs. First, the phrase could be interpreted as an imperative:
“[Take] bong hits . . .”—a message equivalent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to
“smoke marijuana” or “use an illegal drug.” Alternatively, the phrase could be viewed as
celebrating drug use—“bong hits [are a good thing],” or “[we take] bong hits”—and we
discern no meaningful distinction between celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of
fellow students and outright advocacy or promotion.
Id. at 402.
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principal’s actions did not violate the First Amendment. 54
In summation, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence divides student
speech into four categories. Originally, all student speech was governed
by Tinker. Under Tinker, schools can only regulate student speech
reasonably calculated to cause a substantial disruption or material
interference with school activities. Bethel limits Tinker’s applicability
by allowing schools to regulate lewd, vulgar, or plainly offensive student
speech without forecasting disruption.
The Hazelwood Court
distinguished individual student speech on school premises from schoolsponsored speech and held that school officials may regulate student
speech if it is reasonably perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school.
Finally, Morse permits schools to regulate student speech that may
reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use. 55 Although
Morse provides a new analysis, lower courts are still deciding how
Morse fits into the framework. 56
III. CHAOS IN THE LOWER COURTS: ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE WHEN
STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH IS SUBJECT TO PUNISHMENT AT SCHOOL
Students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 57 As one scholar has pointed
out, the negative inference of this passage “implies that outside those
gates, the school should have no power to regulate student speech.” 58
The Supreme Court has not needed to address a school district’s ability
to regulate speech occurring off campus because the student speech
framework cases all dealt with on-campus speech. Because the speech
unequivocally occurred within the schoolhouse gates, the school’s
authority to punish such speech was not in question. 59 In contrast,
student internet speech often cannot be considered to have occurred
within the gates of the schoolhouse. 60 With this in mind, before the
54. Id. at 403.
55. Id.
56. See Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Conn. 2007) (In
Morse, “the Supreme Court extended Fraser to cover on-campus speech that school administrators
could reasonably interpret as advocating the use of drugs, a message ‘clearly disruptive of and
inconsistent with the school’s educational mission to educate students about the dangers of illegal drugs
and to discourage their use.’” (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 399)), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
57. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
58. Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHITS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School Authority
over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN . L. R EV . 1206, 1223
(2008).
59. Id. at 1224.
60. Id. (“In cases involving student cyberspeech, however, it is rarely clear that the speech at
issue occurs within [its] gates.”). “A student who comes to school the morning after creating a website

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/14

10

Patrick: THE CIVILITY-POLICE: THE RISING NEED TO BALANCE STUDENTS’ RIGHTS
PATRICK FINAL Format (Paginated)

2010]

OFF-CAMPUS INTERNET SPEECH

3/18/2011 1:31:51 PM

865

traditional student speech analysis is applied to off-campus student
internet speech, it must be determined that the school’s regulatory power
encompasses it. 61
While recognizing that internet speech is protected by the First
Amendment, the law is unsettled regarding the amount of protection
afforded to off-campus student internet speech. 62 As a result of this
uncertainty, courts have established different methods for determining
when student internet speech is subject to a school’s disciplinary regime.
One approach requires that internet speech fall into the category of oncampus speech before a school can regulate it. 63 If the internet speech is
classified as off-campus speech, schools can only punish the speech if it
falls into one of the unprotected categories such as obscenity, fighting
words, and true threats. 64 Despite the apparent simplicity of the oncampus/off-campus dichotomy, courts have differed with respect to the
analysis used to determine whether student internet speech is considered
on- or off-campus speech. 65 Another approach categorically applies the
Tinker analysis to off-campus internet speech. 66 This Part analyzes the
various approaches taken by lower courts.
A. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals requires that speech be
categorized as on-campus speech before schools can regulate it. In order
to determine when off-campus speech may be considered on-campus
speech, the Seventh Circuit has established what one scholar called the
“place of reception standard.” 67
In Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, a
on her home computer does not bring the site with her, attached to her person.” Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1214–15.
63. See Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998);
J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002); Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2007).
64. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1372–73 (S.D. Fla. 2010); see also supra notes 7–
9 and accompanying text.
65. See Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829 (indicating that where speech was disseminated determines
whether speech is categorized as “on-campus”); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 865 (holding
that school’s ability to regulate off-campus speech depends on whether the speech had sufficient
connections to the school environment); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40 (indicating that analysis of
school’s ability to regulate turns on whether it was foreseeable that the off-campus speech would create
a disruption on campus).
66. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010),
vacated, reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
67. Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How to Analyze Student Speech in the Age of
the Internet, 42 G A . L. R EV . 1127, 1148–49 (2008).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 14
PATRICK FINAL Format (Paginated)

866

3/18/2011 1:31:51 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

student contributor for an underground newspaper published off campus
The
wrote an article about hacking the school’s computers. 68
underground newspaper was distributed at school. 69 The student author,
who was suspended and ultimately expelled for writing the article, 70
brought suit and was granted a preliminary injunction by the district
court. 71 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary
injunction. 72 In doing so, the court held that the traditional student
expression framework applied because the newspaper was distributed on
campus. 73 The court focused on where the speech was ultimately
disseminated, not where it originated. 74
The Seventh Circuit’s “place of reception standard” has been
criticized as establishing a low threshold for when off-campus speech
can be considered on-campus speech, especially when applied to student
internet speech. 75 One problem with the standard is that one unilateral
action by a third party could result in a student’s off-campus internet
speech falling subject to the school’s jurisdiction. For example, a fellow
student accessing the internet speech from a school computer would
bring the speech under the school’s jurisdiction. In addition, this
threshold can easily be manipulated by administrators or a student’s
enemies to bring the speech into the realm of on-campus speech. 76
B. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also requires speech to be
categorized as on-campus speech before schools can regulate it. In order
to determine when off-campus speech may be considered on-campus
speech, the court developed the sufficient nexus test, which looks at
whether the off-campus speech has sufficient connections with the
school before it can be considered on-campus speech.
In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 77 an eighth
grade student was expelled as a result of a website he created on his
68. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 822.
69. Id. (The newspaper was distributed “in bathrooms, in lockers and in the cafeteria at
Greenfield.”).
70. Id. at 823.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 829.
73. Id. “The court focused not on whether the speech was produced on- or off-campus, but
whether it was received in an on- or off-campus context.” Reeves, supra note 67, at 1148.
74. Boucher, 134 F.3d at 829.
75. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1149.
76. Id.
77. 757 A.2d 412 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
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home computer outside of school hours. 78 The website was entitled
“Teacher Sux” and contained web pages with derogatory remarks about
faculty members at the student’s school. 79 The website’s pages
contained offensive language and graphic images of violence directed
toward the school’s staff. 80
One of the teachers received an anonymous e-mail about the website
and reported it to the principal. 81 Investigations by the police and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation identified J.S. as the website’s creator. 82
J.S. was ultimately expelled, 83 and his parents filed suit.
Citing the broad discretion given to a school’s disciplinary policies,
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Court of
Common Pleas’ decision to uphold J.S.’s expulsion. 84 In addressing
J.S.’s First Amendment claim, the court acknowledged that J.S.’s speech
“occurred off of school premises and was communicated to others via
the Internet.” 85 The court looked to precedent to determine “whether a
student may be disciplined for conduct occurring off of school
premises.” 86 Interpreting these cases, the court concluded “courts have
allowed school officials to discipline students for conduct occurring off
of [campus] premises where it is established that the conduct materially
and substantially interferes with the educational process.” 87 In other
words, the court held that off-campus speech can be punished under
Tinker. In applying the substantial and material interference standard to
78. Id. at 415, 417.
79. Id. at 415.
80. Id. at 415–17. The web pages contained curse words including “fuck” and “bitch.” Id. at
416. In addition, one web page contained “a diagram of [a teacher] with her head cut off and blood
dripping from her neck,” while also soliciting money to hire a hitman to kill her. Id. Visitors to the
website had to agree to a disclaimer before they could access the website. Id. at 415 (“The disclaimer
indicated, inter alia, that the visitor was not a member of the School District’s faculty or administration
and that the visitor did not intend to disclose the identity of the web-site creator or intend to cause
trouble for that individual.”).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 415.
83. Id. at 417.
84. Id. at 417, 426.
85. Id. at 419.
86. Id. at 419–21 (citing Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995); Fenton v. Stear, 423 F.
Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998)). But see Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting
Student Internet Speech, 89 VA . L. R EV . 139, 167 (2003) (“A more thorough analysis of these
decisions, however, suggests that they do not in fact support the J.S. court’s conclusion: the J.S. court
misinterpreted one of these decisions, and the other two decisions were themselves of debatable value or
distinguishable from the situation faced by the J.S. court. In short, it seems more likely that the J.S.
court used the decisions to attempt to legitimize its holding as being grounded in the law rather than
public policy.”).
87. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d at 421.
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the facts of the case, the court determined that the evidence indicated the
website hindered the educational process. 88
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the lower
court’s decision, but justified the school’s punishment in an alternative
manner. Before considering the applicability of the student speech
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania examined whether
J.S.’s speech constituted an unprotected true threat and concluded it did
not. 89
The court held that it needed to conduct a two-step inquiry to
determine whether the traditional student speech case law applied. As a
threshold issue the speech’s location must be determined: “[I]s it on
campus speech or purely off-campus speech?” 90 If it is considered oncampus speech, the court considers other factors, including the speech’s
form, effect, and setting, as well as “whether the speech is part of a
school sponsored expressive activity.” 91
In addressing the threshold inquiry, the court developed a sufficient
nexus approach: where speech that originates off campus is aimed at a
specific school or its staff, brought onto the school’s campus, or
accessed at the school by its originator, the speech is to be considered
on-campus speech for purposes of First Amendment analysis. 92
Applying this analysis to J.S.’s speech, the court concluded there was a
sufficient nexus between the website and the school to constitute oncampus speech. 93 The court considered the fact that J.S. had accessed
the website on a school computer, showed the site to another student
while on campus, and discussed the website with other students. 94
Concluding that J.S.’s internet website constituted on-campus speech,
the court moved on to the second step of the inquiry. Although J.S.’s
speech did not fall neatly under any one test, the court attempted to
apply Fraser and Tinker. 95 The court ultimately concluded that the

88. Id. The court indicated that one teacher had to take medical leave based on the website’s
content and that the website’s statements had a negative effect on other students’ perceptions of the
teachers involved. Id. In upholding J.S.’s expulsion, the court also recognized that schools are justified
in taking threats of school violence seriously, as they have become commonplace. Id. at 422.
89. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856–59 (Pa. 2002). After
considering “the statements, the context in which they were made, the reaction of listeners and others as
well as the nature of the comments,” the court concluded J.S.’s statements did not constitute a true threat
and turned to determining the applicability of the student speech jurisprudence. Id. at 858–60.
90. Id. at 864.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 865.
93. Id.
94. Id. Faculty members and administrators had also accessed the website on campus. Id.
95. Id. at 865–68.
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website created a substantial disruption in the school. 96 It found that the
educational process was disrupted because one teacher had to miss class,
which required using substitute teachers. 97 In addition, the court
indicated that several students visited counselors and expressed
anxiety. 98 The court found yet another disruption based on the parents
voicing their displeasure with the situation. 99
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s opinion is important for two
reasons. First, it reinforces that schools may punish students for speech
that is categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. Second, the
court recognized the school’s authority to discipline internet speech once
it determined that the speech could be considered on-campus speech. 100
C. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
The Second Circuit has had two opportunities to address off-campus
student internet speech. In the first case, the Second Circuit indicated
that if it was reasonably foreseeable that off-campus speech would reach
the school, the speech could be regulated under Tinker. One year later,
the Second Circuit applied this framework in a subsequent case. Both
cases will be addressed below.
1. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School
District 101
In Wisniewski, a middle school student created an image with a pistol
firing a bullet into a person’s head; the image displayed the words “Kill
Mr. VanderMolen,” who was a teacher at the middle school. 102 The
image was used as an icon on the student’s AOL Instant Messaging (IM)
messages. 103 When the student sent an AOL IM, 104 the icon helped
96. Id. at 869.
97. Id. The school district’s findings indicated that “Mrs. Fulmer has had lasting effects from
viewing the Web page, including stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight, and a
general sense of lost well-being,” that “Mrs. Fulmer’s lifestyle has changed dramatically,” that “Mrs.
Fulmer has suffered headaches, takes Zanac as an anti-anxiety/anti-depressant, and was unable to return
to school at the end of the year,” and that “Mrs. Fulmer has applied for a medical sabbatical leave for the
1998–99 school year because of her inability to return to teaching.” J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area
Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416–17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
98. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 869.
99. Id.
100. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1144.
101. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
102. Id. at 36.
103. Id. at 35–36.
104. As the Second Circuit noted:
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identify the student as the sender. 105 The student created and
transmitted the icon off campus and did not send it to the teacher or any
other school official. 106 However, another student informed the teacher
about the icon and provided him with a copy of it, which was later
passed on to the principals and the police. 107
Upon receipt of the icon, the school questioned the student and
suspended him for five days. 108 The police also investigated the matter
and concluded that the student meant the icon as a joke, and he did not
pose any threat to the teacher. 109 After the student served his
suspension, the superintendent appointed a hearing officer to determine
whether the student should receive a long-term suspension. 110 At the
conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer recommended to the Board
of Education a one semester suspension, which the Board approved.111
The student filed suit against the school district. 112
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[t]he fact that [the
student’s] creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred away from
school property does not necessarily insulate him from school
discipline.” 113 The Second Circuit concluded “that off-campus conduct
can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a
school,” 114 which allows school officials to regulate the speech
consistent with Tinker. 115 In this case, the court concluded that the

Instant messaging enables a person using a computer with Internet access to exchange
messages in real time with members of a group (usually called “buddies” in IM lingo)
who have the same IM software on their computers. Instant messaging permits rapid
exchanges of text between any two members of a “buddy list” who happen to be on-line
at the same time. Different IM programs use different notations for indicating which
members of a user’s “buddy list” are on-line at any one time. Text sent to and from a
“buddy” remains on the computer screen during the entire exchange of messages between
any two users of the IM program.
Id. at 35.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 36.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. A psychologist also concluded that the icon was meant as a joke and not an actual threat.
Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 37.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 39.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 38. “With respect to school officials’ authority to discipline a student’s expression
reasonably understood as urging violent conduct, we think the appropriate First Amendment standard is
the one set forth by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District . . . .” Id.
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student’s conduct “pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon
would come to the attention of school authorities and that it would
‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school.’” 116 The court concluded it was reasonably foreseeable that the
icon would reach school authorities. 117 Based on the facts of the case,
the court concluded that the First Amendment claims were properly
dismissed. 118
At a minimum, Wisniewski indicates that a school district can punish
speech that occurs entirely off campus. In order for a school district to
be able to punish such speech, it must be reasonably foreseeable that the
speech would reach school property. 119 Wisniewski does not address
which traditional student speech tests are applicable to off-campus
speech, but it does imply that a school district can punish student offcampus speech under Tinker’s substantial disruption and material
interference test.
2. Doninger v. Niehoff
The Doninger line of cases allowed the Second Circuit to flesh out
Wisniewski’s meaning. Doninger, a high school student, was punished
for a posting made on livejournal.com. 120 As a member of student
council, Doninger was responsible for planning a battle of the bands
concert, which having been previously delayed, now faced further
delay. 121 Upset by the potential delay, four student council members
used the school computers to access one of their parent’s e-mail
accounts and send a mass e-mail encouraging local citizens to contact
the superintendent about the problem. 122 Flooded with responses to the
e-mail, the principal met with Doninger and offered her opinions
116. Id. at 38–39 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969)).
117. Id. at 39. The Second Circuit could not unanimously decide whether it must be shown that
the speech was reasonably foreseeable to reach school property or whether the fact that it reached the
school eliminates the need to inquire into foreseeability. Id.
118. Id. at 40.
119. Id. at 39.
120. Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203, 206–08 (D. Conn. 2007),
aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
121. Id. at 203. Jamfest, the battle of the bands concert, had been postponed twice and “was
scheduled to take place on April 28, 2007.” However, the teacher responsible for the auditorium was
not available to work on that day, which forced the principal to either have the students reschedule the
event or hold the event in the cafeteria. Unbeknownst to the students, a Board of Education policy
required the teacher’s presence at all events in the auditorium. Id.
122. Id. at 204–05. Doninger claimed that their faculty advisor suggested sending a mass e-mail
to the taxpayers, but the advisor adamantly rejected making such a suggestion. Id. at 204. Based on the
testimony heard, the court concluded that the advisor’s version of the events was most credible. Id.
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regarding the corrective actions that should be taken. 123 Later that
evening, Doninger posted an entry to her livejournal.com blog regarding
the concert. 124 The blog entry was critical of the administration’s
reaction to the students’ concerns about the concert and encouraged
others to contact the office to anger the administration. 125 A few weeks
later, when the administration discovered the blog entry, Doninger was
prohibited from running for senior class secretary. 126 Despite winning
as a write-in candidate, 127 Doninger was not permitted to hold the office
and another student assumed the position. 128 Doninger’s mother
brought suit claiming violation of her daughter’s First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights 129 and seeking a preliminary injunction requiring the
school to hold a new election for senior class secretary in which she
would be able to run. 130
The District Court of Connecticut found that Doninger failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits and therefore denied her
motion for preliminary injunction. 131
The court concluded that
123. Id. The principal “told [Doninger] that using the school computer system to send a personal
email violated the school’s internet policy, and that in general, the students had failed to act in a manner
appropriate to class officers.” Id. at 205.
124. Id. at 206 (“Livejournal.com is an online community that allows its members to post their
own blog entries and comment on the blog entries of others. One need not be a registered member of
the community to view the webpages, unless a blogger has adjusted her privacy settings to restrict
access, in which case it is possible to view the blog only if the author has previously added the viewer to
her ‘friends’ list. A privacy setting is also available that restricts access to the author alone. At the time
[Doninger] posted her blog entry, her privacy setting was ‘public,’ and [Doninger] understood that this
meant that anyone could view the webpage. The content of the message itself suggests that her purpose
was in fact to encourage her fellow students to read and respond to the blog . . . .”) (citation omitted).
125. Id. In pertinent part, the blog entry stated:
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. . . . basically, because we sent
[the original Jamfest email] out, [the superintendent] is getting a TON of phone calls and
emails and such. . . . however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole
thing all together, anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to have it at all, but in the
slightest chance we do[,] it is going to be after the talent show on may 18th.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 207–08.
127. Id. at 208. In an issue related to this case, but not related to this Comment, the school
prohibited students from wearing “Team Avery” t-shirts into the election assembly. Id. This issue
raises other student free speech concerns.
128. Id. at 208–09.
129. Id. at 202, 211 (Doninger “argues that her First Amendment rights were violated in the
following ways: (1) when she was prevented from running for Senior Class Secretary; (2) when she was
not permitted to wear a ‘Team Avery’ t-shirt into the auditorium on May 25, 2007; and (3) when she
was not permitted to give a speech at the May 25, 2007 assembly.”). Because this Comment focuses on
student internet speech, Doninger’s other First Amendment claims are not addressed. For the same
reason, Doninger’s Equal Protection claim will not be addressed.
130. Id. at 202.
131. Id. at 218, 220.
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Doninger’s speech was created off campus but was “purposely designed
by [Doninger] to come onto the campus.” 132 The district court reiterated
the Second Circuit’s holding in Wisniewski that when off-campus speech
affects the school in a reasonably foreseeable manner, the speech “may
be considered on-campus speech for the purposes of the First
Amendment.” 133 Because the speech was deemed on-campus speech for
First Amendment purposes, the school could regulate the speech based
on the traditional student speech framework. 134 With this in mind, the
district court indicated that Fraser permits school officials to punish
offensive speech, such as that contained in Doninger’s blog, 135 and
Doninger was therefore unlikely to succeed on the merits. 136
Doninger appealed the district court’s decision, but the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction. 137 The
Second Circuit reiterated its holding from Wisniewski “that a student
may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off
school grounds, when this conduct ‘would foreseeably create a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least when it
was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also
reach campus.” 138
The Second Circuit applied the Wisniewski
framework and concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the
online post would reach school property 139 and that once there it would
create a risk of substantial disruption. 140 Because Doninger’s speech
132. Id. at 216.
133. Id. at 217; see also id. at 217 n.11 (“At oral argument, [Doninger’s] counsel suggested that
the holding in Wisniewski should be limited to the Tinker framework; that is, that off-campus speech
directly affecting the school in a reasonably foreseeable manner could only be analyzed under the Tinker
rubric for on-campus speech. The Court, however, does not read Wisniewski to be so limited, and in fact
sees no reason to deny the application of Fraser to off-campus speech that affects the school in a
reasonably foreseeable manner and that would otherwise be analyzed under Fraser had it actually
occurred on-campus.”).
134. See id. at 216–17.
135. Id. at 217.
136. Id. at 218.
137. Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).
138. Id. at 48 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40
(2d Cir. 2007)).
139. Id. at 50. In making this determination, the Second Circuit looked at the fact that Doninger
designed the speech to disseminate onto campus, that the posting pertained to events at the school, and
that Doninger’s intent was to encourage other students to act. Id.
140. Id. “There are three factors in particular on which we rely to reach this conclusion. First, the
language with which [Doninger] chose to encourage others to contact the administration was not only
plainly offensive, but also potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing controversy.” Id. at
50–51. “Second, and perhaps more significantly, [Doninger’s] post used the ‘at best misleading and at
wors[t] false’ information that Jamfest had been cancelled in her effort to solicit more calls and emails
to” the superintendent. Id. at 51. “Moreover, [Doninger] and the other students who participated in
writing the mass email were called away either from class or other activities on the morning of April 25
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could be regulated under the Tinker standard, the Second Circuit did not
decide whether the scope of Fraser encompassed off-campus speech, 141
although it did indicate its reluctance to apply Fraser to Doninger’s offcampus speech. 142
Although the preliminary injunction was denied, the case proceeded.
The district court partially granted summary judgment for the
defendants. 143 Although the Second Circuit was unwilling to address
Fraser’s applicability to the case, the district court stated that until the
Second Circuit overrules its position, “the [c]ourt does not believe there
is any reason to change its position that Ms. Doninger’s First
Amendment rights were not violated.” 144
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the creation
and transmission of internet speech off campus does not always insulate
the student from school discipline. 145 If it is reasonably foreseeable that
off-campus internet speech will reach school authorities and create a risk
of substantial disruption, the off-campus speech is actually on-campus
speech that can be regulated under Tinker. 146 The Second Circuit has
not yet determined whether the reasonable foreseeability test allows a
school district to regulate off-campus student speech under the other
student speech tests. 147 However, at least one district court appears
willing to permit schools to regulate off-campus student speech under
Fraser when it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the
school campus. 148
D. Third Circuit Court of Appeals
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has placed less emphasis on
whether the off-campus student internet speech can be considered onbecause of the need to manage the growing dispute . . . .” Id.
141. Id. at 50. “We need not conclusively determine Fraser’s scope, however, to be satisfied that
[Doninger’s] posting—in which she called school administrators ‘douchebags’ and encouraged others to
contact [the superintendent]‘to piss her off more’—contained the sort of language that properly may be
prohibited in schools.” Id. at 49. “We therefore need not decide whether other standards may apply
when considering the extent to which a school may discipline off-campus speech.” Id.
142. Id. at 49–50.
143. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D. Conn. 2009). The court granted summary
judgment for the defendants on Doninger’s First Amendment claim because the defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity. Id. at 221.
144. Id.
145. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.
2007).
146. Id. at 39–40.
147. See Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
148. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
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campus speech. In contrast to the off-campus/on-campus approach, the
Third Circuit has held that all off-campus internet speech can be
regulated under Tinker.
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, two students
created a fake MySpace profile of their principal, Mr. McGonigle. 149
The profile, which included the principal’s picture, referenced him as a
pedophile and sex addict. 150 Although the profile was allegedly set to a
private setting shortly after its creation, the profile became a topic of
much conversation within the school. 151 After receiving a print-out of
the profile, the principal called one of the students, J.S., to his office. 152
During this meeting, J.S. confessed to creating the profile and was
subsequently suspended for ten days. 153 J.S.’s parents filed suit alleging
violations of their daughter’s First Amendment rights and their own
constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of their child. 154
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. 155 In
doing so, the court concluded that the speech was “akin to the lewd and
vulgar speech” in Fraser. 156 The court also noted that the speech could
have resulted in criminal prosecution. 157 The court held that the school
could punish the student’s off-campus creation when the off-campus
speech had an effect on campus. 158 Because the court found the
connection between the off-campus action and the on-campus effect, the
school’s punishment was constitutional. 159 The parental rights claim
149. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 084138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
150. Id.
151. Id. at *1–2.
152. Id. at *2.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id. at *9.
156. Id. at *6.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *7.
159. Id.
The facts that we are presented with establish much more of a connection between the
off-campus action and on-campus effect. The website addresses the principal of the
school. Its intended audience is students at the school. A paper copy of the website was
brought into school, and the website was discussed in school. The picture on the profile
was appropriated from the school district’s website. Plaintiff crafted the profile out of
anger at the principal for punishment the plaintiff had received at school for violating the
dress code. J.S. lied in school to the principal about the creation of the imposter profile.
Moreover, although a substantial disruption so as to fall under Tinker did not
occur . . . there was in fact some disruption during school hours. Additionally, the profile
was viewed at least by the principal at school and a paper copy of the profile was brought
into school. On these facts, and because the lewd and vulgar off-campus speech had an
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was rejected because J.S.’s activities “were not merely personal home
activities.” 160
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants. 161 The
Third Circuit recognized the need to balance “the protected nature of
off-campus student speech” against the school’s interest in preventing
speech that creates a substantial disruption with school functions. 162
With this in mind, the Third Circuit created a categorical exception to
the on-campus requirement. 163 The Third Circuit held “off-campus
speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a substantial
disruption of or material interference with a school need not satisfy any
geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to Tinker.” 164
In this case, the court held that but for the quick corrective actions taken
by the principal, the profile would have created a reasonable possibility
of disruption. 165
Schools within the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction can regulate on- and
off-campus student speech under Tinker. 166
Having created a
categorical exception for Tinker’s application, which governed the
current case, the Third Circuit declined to determine “whether a school
official may discipline a student for her lewd, vulgar, or offensive offcampus speech that has an effect on-campus.” 167
E. United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
has established a hybrid approach. This approach embraces the

effect on-campus, we find no error in the school administering discipline to J.S.
Id. (citation omitted).
160. Id. at *9.
161. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated,
reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
162. Id. at 299.
163. Id. at 301.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 300 (“[T]he profile presented a reasonable possibility of a future disruption, which was
preempted only by McGonigle’s expeditious investigation of the profile, which secured its quick
removal, and his swift punishment of its creators.”).
166. One scholar has recognized that Tinker’s language seems to permit regulation of off-campus
speech that created a substantial disruption within the school. Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public
Schools vs. MySpace and Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. C IN . L.
R EV . 707, 712 (2008) (“For off-campus speech, . . . Tinker is probably the only ruling that may be
applied; recall that in Tinker, the Supreme Court expressly referred to speech occurring ‘in class or out
of it.’”).
167. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/14

22

Patrick: THE CIVILITY-POLICE: THE RISING NEED TO BALANCE STUDENTS’ RIGHTS
PATRICK FINAL Format (Paginated)

2010]

OFF-CAMPUS INTERNET SPEECH

3/18/2011 1:31:51 PM

877

traditional on-campus/off-campus dichotomy while at the same time it
recognizes that off-campus speech may potentially be regulated under
Tinker.
In Evans v. Bayer, 168 a senior created a Facebook group entitled, “Ms.
Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met,” which served as a place
for students to voice their grievances. 169 The student made a posting
stating: “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met! To those
select students who have had the displeasure of having Ms. Sarah
Phelps, or simply knowing her and her insane antics: Here is the place to
express your feelings of hatred.” 170 The group was created after school
hours from a home computer; the postings were never seen by the
teacher; there was no threat of violence or disruption at school; and the
posting was removed after two days. 171
The principal found out about the posting, suspended the student, and
forced her to take fewer advanced placement courses. 172 The student
brought suit against the principal for violations of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and sought an injunction and nominal
damages. 173 The principal filed a motion to dismiss, which the district
court denied with respect to the nominal damages because the principal
was not entitled to qualified immunity. 174 In determining that the
defendant violated the Constitution, the district court synthesized the
various Supreme Court and circuit court rulings in order to establish a
basic framework. 175 First, the location of the speech “should be
determined at the outset in order to decide whether the ‘unique
concerns’ of the school environment are implicated.” 176 On-campus
speech can be regulated according to the student expression standards.
The district court indicated that “[s]tudent off-campus speech, though
generally protected, could be subject to analysis under the Tinker
standard . . . if the speech raises on-campus concerns.” 177 In addition,
168. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365(S.D. Fla. 2010).
169. Id. at 1367.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1377. “To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant
violated a constitutional right, and (2) that this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Id. at 1369. The district court granted the motion to dismiss regarding the injunction
because an officer sued in his or her individual capacity could not be ordered to perform the injunction’s
mandate. Id.
175. Id. at 1369–73.
176. Id. at 1370 (citing J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002)).
177. Id. (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010),
vacated, reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010)).
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off-campus speech can be disciplined by the schools if it is unprotected
speech. 178
The district court determined that the student’s speech was offcampus speech. 179 In making this determination, the court rejected the
argument that the mere fact that the speech’s intended audience was the
school, was by itself, enough to label the speech as occurring on
campus. 180 The district court concluded that the student’s off-campus
speech could not be viewed as creating a well-founded expectation of
disruption, precluding Tinker’s application. 181 The district court also
rejected the principal’s argument that no constitutional violation existed
because the principal could punish the off-campus speech under
Fraser. 182 After determining that the principal violated the student’s
constitutional rights, the district court indicated that the law was clearly
established and denied the principal’s motion to dismiss the claim for
nominal damages. 183
IV. CALMING THE CHAOS: COURTS MUST BALANCE ANY COMPELLING
INTEREST THE SCHOOL HAS IN PUNISHING OFF-CAMPUS INTERNET SPEECH
AGAINST STUDENTS’ RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts
have struggled to apply the current student speech framework to student
internet speech. 184 The lack of guidance has created numerous
problems. First, the lower courts inconsistently apply the existing
student speech framework and reach different conclusions. 185 Further
complicating the problem is that “courts have interpreted differently the
distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech, with some
courts defining on-campus speech much more expansively than other
courts.” 186
This inconsistency creates other problems. Without an adequate
178. Id. 1372.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1371.
181. Id. at 1373. “[T]he key is whether the school administrators have a well-founded belief that a
‘substantial’ disruption will occur.” Id.
182. Id. at 1374. “Fraser’s First Amendment rights were circumscribed in light of the school
environment in which the speech occurred. For the Court to equate a school assembly to the entire
internet would set a precedent too far reaching.” Id. (citation omitted).
183. Id. at 1377.
184. See Williams, supra note 166, at 719 (“The Supreme Court has never addressed student
Internet speech specifically, and it is difficult for lower courts to apply the existing framework to [these]
type of cases.”).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 720.
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framework, school districts lack adequate guidance in crafting
policies 187 and in disciplining student internet speech. 188 In order to
effectively administer their schools, public school officials
must be able to determine (1) when student Internet speech created offcampus may be considered on-campus speech and (2) when student
Internet speech constitutes a material and substantial disruption if the
students cannot access the speech from school. Public schools must be
capable of making these determinations with certainty, or schools may
continue punishing students for speech protected by the First
Amendment. 189

The lack of clear guidelines results not only in the punishment of
protected speech, but the uncertainty also increases the amount of
litigation. 190
Instead of focusing on educating, administrators
continuously have to defend against lawsuits.
If schools are uncertain regarding what student internet speech they
may regulate, it follows that students are inherently unsure of when they
will be subject to their school’s jurisdiction. 191 Without notice of when
their internet speech will be subject to punishment at school, students are
unable to appropriately censor themselves from making improper
statements online. 192 Students may therefore refrain from expressing
187. Id. at 724; see also Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for
Public School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. R EV . 1563, 1566–67 (2009) (“In
order for schools to draft appropriate policies in compliance with cyberbullying statutes, school officials
need clarity on the boundaries of their authority over online activity and the extent to which the First
Amendment protects students’ online expression.”).
188. Williams, supra note 166, at 719 (“[T]he current jurisprudence provides only limited
guidance to the schools addressing student Internet speech, especially when social networking sites are
involved.”); see also Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment
Framework for Educators who seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. R EV . 635, 640
(2000) (In dealing with student internet speech containing low value speech, educators are virtually
limited to two alternatives, creating a “dangerous dilemma”: “The educators can take a threat seriously,
possibly infringing students’ First Amendment rights, and then become confronted with a lawsuit
brought by indignant parents. Alternatively, educators can wait to see if the vociferous, threatening
student eventually comes to school carrying a handgun, intent on fulfilling his murderous threats.”).
189. See Williams, supra note 166, at 722.
190. See Hoder, supra note 187, at 1568 (“The current unpredictability in online student speech
case law has resulted in . . . a plethora of litigation.”).
191. Id. at 1600 (“The vague and unpredictable standards currently applied in online student
speech cases do not give students any guidance on when their expression is beyond the school’s
reach.”).
192. Id. at 1568 (“The current unpredictability in online student speech case law has resulted in a
lack of fair notice to students, a potential chilling of student Internet use and expression . . . .”); see also
Williams, supra note 166, at 725 (“[M]ore guidance would enable schools to communicate to students
and parents the circumstances under which students may be punished for their Internet speech. Such
communication benefits schools as well as students and parents. First, it is likely to discourage students
from making improper statements or posting improper pictures and persuade parents to more closely
monitor their children’s Internet speech. This would limit the occurrence of improper student Internet
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themselves online; the lack of concrete guidelines thus has a chilling
effect on the exercise of constitutional rights. Students also suffer
because uncertainty results in the punishment of protected speech, a
problem exacerbated by “school administrators [who] lack a strong
incentive to protect the free speech rights of their students [as] they are
more concerned with preserving the integrity of the educational process
against perceived threats.” 193
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court and the presence
of confusion in the lower courts, scholars have attempted to define when
off-campus student internet speech should be subject to punishment by
school administrators. The approaches often suggest different methods
for determining when off-campus internet speech may be considered oncampus speech subject to the Supreme Court’s traditional framework.
The first portion of this Part critiques some of these scholarly
approaches. The second portion of this Part proposes a new approach,
which deemphasizes the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy.
A. Scholarly Approaches to Off-Campus Student Internet Speech
1. The Student’s Intent Governs
In his early scholarly foray into student internet speech, Alexander
Tuneski suggested that the courts “establish a clear rule that off-campus
speech is not subject to the jurisdiction of school officials.” 194 This rule
requires a clear line between off-campus and on-campus speech. 195
Tuneski suggested drawing “[t]he line between on- and off-campus
expression . . . based on where the expression originated and how it was
disseminated.” 196 If the speech was created and disseminated off
campus, the speech could not be regulated by the school. However, if
the author of the off-campus speech took “steps to bring the material to a
school campus,” the speech could be considered on-campus speech
subject to the school’s authority. 197 Affirmative steps to bring the
speech and decrease the frequency of speech-based punishments.”).
193. See Brenton, supra note 58, at 1206; see also Hoder, supra note 187, at 1568, 1597 (“As a
result of the uncertainty in this area of the law, schools can regulate online speech liberally and without
the fear of paying damages for a First Amendment violation because, even if a school official violates a
student’s speech rights, the official will be granted qualified immunity from monetary damages if the
disciplinary action was ‘objectively reasonable in light of “clearly established” law at the time of the
violation.’”).
194. See Tuneski, supra note 86, at 177.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Kenneth R. Pike, Comment, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by
Repairing Judicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008 B.Y.U. L.
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speech on campus include “opening a web page at school, telling others
to view the site from school, distributing a newspaper as students enter
school, and sending e-mail to school accounts.” 198 If the off-campus
speech reached campus due to the actions of a third-party and not the
author of the speech, the speech would still be considered off-campus. 199
Essentially, Tuneski suggests that to determine whether speech occurs
on or off campus, courts must look “to the objective intent of the speaker
and whether the student affirmatively acted to bring the speech oncampus.” 200
In order to determine a student’s intent, another scholar has suggested
looking at the type of technology used to communicate the message.
This scholar suggests that the type of technology used by the student can
be evidence of the student’s intent because “an understanding of
technology makes it possible to draw analogies between ‘material
world’ practices and cyber-speech, demonstrating that certain uses of
technology are more like on-campus speech, while other uses of
technology more closely resemble true off-campus speech.” 201 The
scholar breaks technology into three separate categories: (1) telephony,
(2) instant messaging and email, and (3) websites. Telephony, directly
calling the school, creates an active, direct presence at the school, which
would make any such communication on-campus speech. 202 Instant
messaging is similar to using the telephone but in printed form, while
sending an email to a teacher is comparable to calling the teacher’s
desk. 203 With this in mind, “email and instant messaging should only
establish an active telepresence where the student engaged in the
R EV . 971, 1007 (“Whether a student can be considered ‘on campus’ for purposes of disciplining their
expression should depend on whether their expression was intended to directly influence the school
environment, or whether such influence arose as the incidental result of off-campus expression.”).
198. See Tuneski, supra note 86, at 178.
199. Id. at 177–78 (“If, however, the off-campus expression reaches the school passively without
any intentional efforts by the author to disseminate the speech on-campus, schools would be prevented
from sanctioning the student for the effects of the speech, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that it
would reach the school. If the author does not take steps to encourage the dissemination at school, it can
be presumed that the author intended the speech which originated off-campus to be viewed and received
off-campus. Thus, the distinction relies on evidence that the author proactively took steps to have the
material read or disseminated at school.”) (citations omitted).
200. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1149.
201. Pike, supra note 197, at 1002 (“[W]e will refer to student use of technology that has the same
impact as any other off-campus speech as establishing a ‘passive telepresence’—meaning that even if
the student’s expression has on-campus influence, such influence is not the active or intended result of
the challenged expression. The alternative is an ‘active telepresence’ by which a student seeks to
directly impact the campus environment through remote means. The hope is that courts can preserve the
Tinker rendition of the schoolhouse gate, despite the problems posed by ubiquitous information
technology.”).
202. Id. at 1002–03.
203. Id. at 1003.
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challenged expression deliberately transmitted it directly to the school’s
network.” 204 In contrast to the first two modes of communication, a
website is not sent directly by the author, but rather the information must
be affirmatively requested by a third party.205 Instead of suggesting that
a website could never be considered on-campus speech, the scholar
suggests that the inquiry should be whether the student “‘intend[ed] to
communicate’ his or her Web site to an audience on campus.” 206
Allowing a student’s intent to govern whether speech is on- or offcampus speech has two major problems. The first problem is how to
determine intent: an objective analysis would consider what a reasonable
person would think was the student’s intent; a subjective analysis would
look to what the student in question actually intended. The second
problem is that under this standard internet speech that creates a threat of
violence could go unregulated. Applying this standard to internet
statements containing hate messages, “school officials would be
powerless to take any preventative action against the students based on
this speech unless those students took affirmative steps to introduce
[those messages] on-campus.” 207 In critical situations, ultimately,
schools would not have adequate authority to prevent potential calamity.
2. Applying Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence to Student Internet
Speech
A second scholarly approach suggests applying personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence to the student internet speech context. The key inquiry is
whether the school’s exercise of jurisdiction over the student’s internet
speech “is supported by minimum contacts with the school environment
such that the authority does not offend notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” 208
A court using this test would first determine whether the student’s
204. Id. at 1004.
205. Id. (“One can create a Web site and post to the Internet without any reference to the school’s
network, and all it takes to bring the content on campus is for someone on campus to visit the site.
Because this requires an affirmative request from someone on campus, a Web site could never in itself
constitute an ‘active telepresence.’”).
206. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 166, at 728–31 (suggesting that a student’s decision to set
their social networking profile to either private or public is a strong suggestion of the student’s intent
and that “[r]evising and modifying Tinker to factor into consideration the differences between public
profiles and private profiles [would result] in a standard that both protects student speech rights and
ensures that the schools are able to maintain order and discipline”).
207. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1150 (“For example, prior to the mass shootings at Columbine
High School in 1999, killers Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold created web pages that were hosted offcampus and contained ominous statements and hate messages.”).
208. See Brenton, supra note 58, at 1231.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/14

28

Patrick: THE CIVILITY-POLICE: THE RISING NEED TO BALANCE STUDENTS’ RIGHTS
PATRICK FINAL Format (Paginated)

2010]

3/18/2011 1:31:51 PM

OFF-CAMPUS INTERNET SPEECH

883

internet speech had “sufficient minimum contacts with the school
environment.” 209 Under the minimum contacts analysis, minimum
contacts exist if the internet speech took place on campus. 210
Additionally, if off-campus internet speech had a clear connection with
the school, the speech may have sufficient minimum contacts with the
school environment. 211 In determining whether the contacts were
sufficient, the court would have to determine if the students purposefully
availed themselves of the school environment. 212 However, if the
minimum contacts with the school are based on the unilateral actions of
a third party, the speech would not fall within the school’s
jurisdiction. 213
If the student’s internet speech has the required minimum contacts
with the school, the second inquiry is whether “the school’s exercise of
authority offends notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 214 This
inquiry would seek to balance the student’s right to free speech against
the school’s interest in maintaining order. 215
Unfortunately, this approach only provides real guidance for the
courts. Using personal jurisdiction, a confusing topic even for law
students, would require middle and high school students as well as
school administrators to understand the concept of minimum contacts.
The complexity of this approach does not fix the lack of Supreme Court
guidance because students will still not be fully aware of when their
online speech may be subject to discipline. With no notice, students will
still be unable to appropriately censor their online speech to avoid
209. Id. at 1234.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1234–35. When a student’s internet speech is “created off-campus, but has a clear and
unambiguous connection to the school environment, the court should examine the purported connection
between the speech and the school to determine whether the student purposefully availed herself of the
school environment in creating the speech.” Id. at 1234.
212. Id. at 1235.
Factors that a court should consider in making this determination include whether the
access happened only once or multiple times; whether the student merely viewed the site
herself or showed it to others; and the student’s purpose in accessing the site—was it
accessed in school for a school-related purpose, or merely incidentally during school
hours? . . .
....
The second way in which a student might purposefully avail herself of the school
environment is by intentionally targeting the school environment with an aim to doing
harm there.
Id.
213. Id. at 1237 (“A student should . . . not be subject to the power of a school to censor speech
merely because a third party brings that speech inside the schoolhouse gates.”).
214. Id. at 1240.
215. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

29

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 14
PATRICK FINAL Format (Paginated)

884

3/18/2011 1:31:51 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

punishment.
3. The “Scope of a Student” Analysis
One scholar proposes borrowing from the realm of public employee
free speech rights to establish the scope of a student test. 216 A public
employee’s free speech rights are governed by Garcetti v. Ceballos,
which clarified the test used in previous Supreme Court cases. 217 The
“scope of a student” test’s two prongs are similar in form to the first and
third prongs of the public employee speech analysis. First, the role in
which the individual spoke is considered. Then, if necessitated by the
first inquiry, the government’s interests are balanced against the
speaker’s rights.
In applying the principles of the public employee free speech doctrine
to determine if student speech is on-campus or off-campus, the scholar
first asks whether the speech in question clearly took place on
campus. 218 If there is any doubt that the student speech occurred on
campus, “then students, school administrators, and courts should ask:
Did the speech occur within the scope of the speaker’s status as a
student?” 219 In answering this question, the inquiry should be a but-for
test; in other words, “[b]ut for the fact that the speaker was a student,
would the speech have occurred?” 220
216. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1154.
217. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). The Supreme Court has established a three-pong test for determining
when a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected. First, the speech must be made as a
citizen, which means the speech cannot be made pursuant to official employment duties. Id. at 421.
Second, the speech must be on a matter of public concern. Id. at 418. Third, the court must determine
whether the government as an employer had grounds for treating the employee differently than the
general public. Id.
218. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1154.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1157; see also id. at 1157–58 (“For example, when a student posts a message on his or
her website that contains derogatory references to his or her principal, the but-for inquiry would be
answered in the negative: But for the fact that the speaker was a student at the principal’s school, the
speech would not have occurred. Thus, the offending speech occurred within the scope of the speaker’s
status as a student.”). But see Hoder, supra note 187, at 1594–95 (“[A] school would not have
jurisdiction over speech just because it relates to the school,” instead “the control and supervision test
[should be used] to determine school jurisdiction over students’ online speech because it is a temporal
test and, as a result, it avoids the problem of establishing a geographical location for online speech.”).
Under this scholar’s proposed test,
schools would have jurisdiction to regulate only speech that occurs when the school has
assumed control and supervision over the student who is speaking. Speech would be
considered within the school’s authority only when the student accesses and shows the
online speech to others, or creates the online speech while that student is under the
assumed control and supervision of the school. All other online student speech would
remain outside of the school’s jurisdiction and under the authority of the parent or law
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If the speech occurred due to the speaker’s status as a student, the
speech is considered on-campus speech, which the school may
constitutionally punish based on the traditional student speech
jurisprudence. 221 In comparison, if the speech did not occur within the
scope of the speaker’s status as a student, “the speech should be treated
as off-campus speech” and presumed to be constitutionally protected. 222
However, the school does not completely lose its ability to regulate
student speech when it occurs off campus. 223 If the speech is offcampus speech the scope of the student test requires a determination
regarding “whether the school has a legitimate justification to infringe
on the student speaker’s First Amendment rights.” 224 This burden will
likely only be met if the school attempts to regulate a category of speech
that traditionally falls outside the protection of the First Amendment. 225
While the scope of the student test provides a unique approach to the
on-campus/off-campus dichotomy, it fails to provide any meaningful
protection for students’ First Amendment rights. The inquiry into
whether the speech would have occurred but-for the speaker being a
student turns any off-campus speech tangentially related to the school
into on-campus speech. Although the inquiry is tied to the student’s
status and choices regarding speech, the standard creates a threshold that
is too low.
This proposed standard overvalues the need for
administrative guidance and devalues the student’s constitutional rights.
4. Eliminate the On-Campus/Off-Campus Distinction
One scholar has boldly proposed eliminating the on-campus/offcampus distinction when dealing with student internet speech because
the distinction is riddled with inherent flaws. 226 First, the lower courts
are fractured regarding an appropriate standard for determining when
speech that occurs off campus can be considered on-campus speech. 227
Due to the lack of a consistent standard, some courts have so broadly
enforcement to regulate.
Id. at 1594–95 (citations omitted).
221. See Reeves, supra note 67, at 1154. If the speech occurred within the scope of the speaker’s
status as a student, “the speech should be treated as on-campus speech, and school administrators should
be able to impose reasonable censorship or punishment based on the three standards articulated by the
Supreme Court in Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood.” Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1158.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Li, supra note 3, at 92–93.
227. Id. at 92.
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defined when off-campus speech constitutes on-campus speech that they
have virtually destroyed any meaningful distinction between the two. 228
Finally, the distinction fails to take into account the unique nature of the
internet. As a “borderless medium,” the internet contains significant
distinctions from traditional mediums of expression. 229
In light of the unique nature and pervasiveness of the internet, the
scholar proposes a new standard that attempts to balance the two
competing interests at play: “protecting a student’s individual free
speech rights and protecting schools from violent student behavior.”230
This proposed standard only applies to student internet speech that does
not bear the imprimatur of the school. 231 In those cases, the Fraser and
Hazelwood standards should apply. 232 “Once a court determines
that . . . Fraser and Hazelwood . . . do not apply,” it must decide, given
the totality of the circumstances, “whether the speech constitutes a true
threat under the reasonable speaker approach,” 233 which is a fact
intensive inquiry. If the speech does not constitute a true threat, the
court should apply the Tinker test. 234 Ultimately, this approach is
similar to the approach taken by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Blue Mountain School District and allows all internet speech to be
regulated under Tinker.
The problem with this approach is that all internet speech is subject to
Tinker, an analysis which has lost much if not all of its bite. 235 If all
228. Id. “Additionally, although courts generally protect off-campus speech, the standards are so
malleable that a court could possibly justify punishing a student even if the speech actually occurred offcampus.” Id. at 93.
229. Id. at 93. “The Internet differs from other traditional mediums of expression, such as flyers,
newspapers, and public speeches, for several reasons: (1) it is pervasive, (2) it allows users to
disseminate information to millions of people immediately and easily, and (3) it can be accessed
anywhere.” Id.
230. Id. at 97.
231. Id. at 98. “[I]t is important to emphasize that this new standard should only apply to Internetrelated student speech cases that do not involve school-sponsored events or activities.”
232. Id. “However, if the school sponsors the Internet-related student speech or includes it as part
of a school-sponsored activity, then the Fraser and Kuhlmeier standards should apply, and schools
should be able to exercise control over the activities they sponsor.” Id.
233. Id. at 99.
[A] court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the listeners’
reactions, the speaker’s intentions, the school’s reaction, and whether the threats sound
equivocal. When looking at the speaker’s intentions, a court should consider several
factors: the student’s academic standing, the student’s level of social activity, the
student’s psychological history, and the student’s willingness and promptness to remove
the Internet speech in question.
Id. (citations omitted).
234. Id.
235. “Unfortunately, most courts that apply the Tinker standard are far too deferential to the
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internet speech is subject to a substantial disruption test, it seems
“school officials with an axe to grind over the disrespectful commentary
of immature, ungrateful students” receive the primary benefits. 236 By
giving schools such broad authority, students are likely to be punished
for constitutionally protected speech. Consider Avery Doninger, who
referred to the administration as “douchebags”: courts are upholding
punishments for what is essentially name-calling under Tinker’s
substantial disruption test. 237 Allowing speech such as Doninger’s to be
punished under Tinker ignores the fact that the speech is student
criticism that, while not proper or eloquent, “encourages improvement in
the educational process.” 238 This problem is exacerbated by the
deference courts give to the decisions of school officials. 239
B. A New Approach: Allowing Schools to Regulate Off-Campus Internet
Speech if the School has a Compelling Interest
Up to now, courts and scholars have failed to provide a workable
standard for addressing a school’s ability to punish student internet
speech. The inability of courts and scholars to provide a framework
stems from using the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy to determine
whether a school can regulate student internet speech. This Part
provides a new mode of analysis, which deemphasizes the oncampus/off-campus dichotomy. If the student internet speech is
schools’ claims that the speech at issue caused a reasonable fear of substantial disruption . . . courts
generally permit the unreasonable reaction of teachers and school officials to constitute a disturbance.”
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 F LA . L. R EV . 1027, 1067 (2008)
(citation omitted). “The lower courts are all over the map in the way in which they apply Tinker’s
requirement that the expression cause a material-and-substantial disruption or interfere with the rights of
others.” Id. at 1065. “Some courts conclude that Tinker’s material-and-substantial disruption standard
is met when other students distribute, read, and react to the material at issue, or even when only the
school administration reacts to the speech.” Id.
236. See Pike, supra note 197, at 1000.
237. See supra notes 125, 140–141 and accompanying text.
238. See Pike, supra note 197, at 999.
239. See Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1054 (“[T]he Court’s increasing deference to school
administrators indicates that the Court is willing to give schools wide berth when it comes to
disciplining their students for their expression, regardless of which medium they use.”); see also Sean R.
Nuttall, Note, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L.
R EV . 1282, 1293–94 (2008) (“[T]he Tinker standard actually mandates deference to the reasonable
decisions of educators as to the likelihood of disruption and provides only very modest protection for
student speech.”); Adrianne Mittelstaedt, Note, Dressing up a Constitutional Issue: First Amendment
Protection of School Uniform Protests in Lowry v. Watson Chapel School District and the Threads
Remaining to Enforce School Policies, 32 H AMLINE L. R EV . 609, 644–45 (2009) (“The underlying
policy of [the Supreme Court’s cases following Tinker] represents judicial deference to school officials,
with intervention being appropriate only when the regulation lacks a viewpoint-neutral pedagogical
purpose.”).
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considered on-campus speech, the school may punish the speech under
existing Supreme Court student speech jurisprudence. However, if the
student internet speech is deemed off-campus, the school may regulate
the speech if their compelling interest outweighs the student’s interest in
his or her First Amendment rights.
1. Establishing a New Standard
As an initial matter, this new framework requires a mode of
determining whether student internet speech can be considered oncampus speech. Because this determination will not prohibit school
districts from regulating student internet speech, the method used should
be the most student-protective standard possible. 240 With this in mind,
the student speaker’s intent should be used to determine whether his or
her internet speech is on- or off-campus speech. 241 This analysis should
not be based on the student’s subjective intent, as actual intent would be
difficult to determine, 242 but instead the analysis should be objective. 243
An objective analysis should ask whether a reasonable person would
believe, given the circumstances surrounding the student’s speech,
including the mode of technology used 244 and any steps taken to ensure
the privacy of the speech, 245 that the student intended to guarantee his
speech reached the school. If the answer is yes, the speech is deemed
on-campus speech subject to the Supreme Court’s existing student
speech jurisprudence. If the answer is no, then the school and the court
should engage in the balancing test discussed below.
If a student’s internet speech cannot objectively be said to have been
deliberately sent into the school’s purview, a presumption arises that the
speech is protected by the First Amendment. 246 The school has the
burden of showing a compelling interest in punishing the speech that
outweighs the student’s interest in the constitutional right to freedom of
speech. 247 Additionally, schools retain the ability to punish off-campus

240. Another reason for a student protective inquiry is the expansion of the school’s jurisdiction to
off-campus speech.
241. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text.
242. See Hoder, supra note 187, at 1595 (“A student’s intent should not be the definitive test,
because it is difficult to prove a student’s actual subjective intent.”).
243. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 201–206 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 206.
246. See Williams, supra note 166, at 728 (“[W]hen student Internet speech occurs offcampus . . . schools and courts should presume the speech is protected by the First Amendment.”).
247. This approach is similar to the balancing test originally used in the public employee free
speech context, but its application is more stringent by requiring the school to have a compelling interest
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internet speech that falls outside the protection of the First
Amendment. 248
While a comprehensive list of compelling interests is beyond the
scope of this Comment, the spirit of the Supreme Court’s student speech
jurisprudence provides guidance regarding what would qualify as such
an interest. For example, the spirit of Tinker recognizes that schools are
justified in preventing violence at their facilities. Therefore, if it were
reasonably foreseeable that the off-campus student internet speech
would cause violence at the school, the school would have a compelling
interest in preventing the violence. Collectively, Bethel, Hazelwood,
and Morse stand for the principle that schools may take steps to regulate
inappropriate speech when such speech is or seems to be closely
associated with the school. Therefore, if the off-campus student internet
speech actually bore the imprimatur of the school, the school would
have a compelling interest in disassociating itself with such speech. 249
In other words, if a student created a webpage that contained the school
district’s official emblem as well as inappropriate language, the school
would have a compelling interest in disassociating itself from the
speech. 250
2. Allowing Schools to Expand Their Reach Beyond the Schoolhouse
Gates
The internet provides new technology for students to express
grievances that prior generations expressed without technology.251
While students have gossiped about teachers and fellow students for
decades, the mode of communication has changed from face-to-face
conversations to sending e-mails and instant messages. 252 These new
in regulating the speech. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (The Court recognized the need “to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”). However, this approach is more lenient in its application than the balancing test set forth
by the scope of the student test. See supra notes 224–225 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
249. This approach goes further than the approach taken by the scholar who proposed eliminating
the on-campus/off-campus distinction. Under that scholar’s proposal, “if the school sponsors the
Internet-related student speech or includes it as part of a school-sponsored activity, then the Fraser and
Kuhlmeier standards should apply, and schools should be able to exercise control over the activities they
sponsor.” See Li, supra note 3, at 98.
250. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (“[T]hese cases . . . recognize that
deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important-indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.” (quoting
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995))).
251. Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1036.
252. Id. at 1036–37.
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means of communication make it easier for adults to see what minors are
saying. 253 In light of these changes, a new issue has arisen: if the
content of the speech is similar, then why should the mode of
communication used alter the school’s ability to punish speech?
Ultimately, just as technology has changed, so have many of the legal
circumstances that justify allowing schools to regulate off-campus
internet speech.
Expanding school jurisdiction to off-campus internet speech may
seem like a drastic step; however, allowing schools to regulate offcampus behavior is not a novel concept. State legislation demonstrates
the growing trend in allowing schools to punish off-campus behavior.
States already allow certain off-campus activities to be regulated. 254
One scholar has pointed out, that states statutorily authorize school
disciplinary action for students who commit crimes or who participate in
activities that endanger the school environment, even if the conduct took
place off campus. 255
Courts have acknowledged and played a more active role in
recognizing a school’s right to regulate off-campus behavior to the
extent that “some courts are now upholding schools’ decisions to punish
certain student speech originating off-campus.” 256 For example, in Blue
Mountain School District, the Third Circuit created a categorical
exception allowing all internet speech to be regulated under Tinker. 257
This trend recognizes that even though speech originates off-campus,
internet speech is more transferable and can still impact the school,
which justifies punishment. 258 In other words, while the speech may
still contain a grievance about a teacher, internet speech, unlike face-toface conversations, creates a permanent record of the speech that can be
transferred to the school environment, thereby making it more likely to
reach and affect the school environment.
Additionally, schools and courts have become acutely aware of the
effect violence can have on the school environment. The threat of
violence has been a motivating factor used by the courts to expand the
253. Id. at 1037.
254. Pike, supra note 197, at 977; see also Hoder, supra note 187, at 1604 (“[S]tatutes in many
states allow a school to suspend a student who is charged with a felony committed on or off campus, and
expel a student who is convicted of a felony if the school administrator determines that ‘the student’s
continued presence in school would have a substantial detrimental effect on the general welfare of the
school.’” (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (1996))).
255. Pike, supra note 197, at 977.
256. May, supra note 4, at 1129.
257. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated,
reh’g, en banc, granted, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
258. May, supra note 4, at 1129.
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school’s jurisdiction off campus. 259
The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has recognized that “in this day and age where school
violence is becoming more commonplace, school officials are justified
in taking threats . . . seriously.” 260 The need to prevent violence is
accentuated by the occurrence of tragedies such as school shootings, 261
and by “[c]hildren’s constant exposure to violent images on television,
video games, and movies.” 262 Allowing schools to regulate off-campus
student internet speech when the speech is indicative of violence ensures
that schools can take preventative measures to avoid a possible
massacre.
Finally, allowing off-campus internet speech to be regulated by the
schools helps reduce the impact the technological generation gap has on
the constitutionality of student internet speech. Today’s generation is
“completely connected to, and dependent on, the Internet.” 263 This
generational gap in internet use and understanding appears in court
decisions where judges fail to understand the internet as a forum, which
“hinders a court from fully assessing the purpose and intended audience
of the student’s speech.” 264 By allowing courts to regulate off-campus
speech, the inability to properly understand the internet is deemphasized,
especially because the ultimate question does not depend on the answer
to an on-campus/off-campus distinction laden with technological
complexities.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “First Amendment rights
apply differently in different situations, for example the school
environment.” 265 The internet must be accepted as a special situation.266

259. See supra notes 87–88, 164 and accompanying text.
260. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 853 (Pa. 2002).
261. See Williams, supra note 166, at 723 (“[M]any public schools argue, and many courts agree,
that following the tragedies at Columbine High School and other schools throughout the country,
schools are in an ‘acutely difficult position’ to prevent violent statements from resulting in violent
actions.”); see also Seminski, supra note 1, at 169–70 (“Some educators and legal scholars aver that
these are merely isolated incidents. As time has proven, however, the fact is that these occurrences are
more than isolated incidents and such dangerous Internet-related conduct is not limited to only these
deadly threats.”) (citations omitted); Hoder, supra note 187, at 1566 (“An increase in school violence
and a number of highly publicized student suicides have highlighted the problem of abusive online
activity by students and put pressure on legislatures and school officials to pass tougher laws and
implement stricter discipline policies to punish cyberbullying.”).
262. Li, supra note 3, at 66.
263. May, supra note 4, at 1127. The “[s]tudent’s frequent and skilled Internet use stands . . . in
stark contrast to adults’ and educators’ Internet use.” Id.
264. Id. at 1127–28.
265. Seminski, supra note 1, at 183; see also Hoder, supra note 187, at 1603 (“The primary
justifications given by the Supreme Court for affording students only limited First Amendment rights are
that: (1) public schools are not traditional public forums and, as a result, a school’s inaction may be
interpreted by the community as the school’s endorsement of a student’s speech, and (2) schools have a
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In the modern world, allowing schools to punish off-campus student
internet speech is a necessary and proper analytical tool, which will
provide increased protection for student free speech.
3. The Need for a Compelling Interest Standard
When student internet speech takes place off campus, it “normally
does not implicate the ‘special characteristics of the school
environment.’” 267 For one reason, recipients of off-campus internet
speech are not a captive audience 268 as are students whose attendance at
school is mandated by law. 269 Therefore, if schools are allowed to
regulate off-campus speech, a test needs to be implemented that properly
balances the interests of all parties involved. Requiring schools to
justify punishment of off-campus student internet speech with a
compelling interest for doing so properly balances these interests.
First, the compelling interest test places a high burden on the school
to overcome the presumption that a student’s off-campus speech is
protected by the First Amendment. The compelling interest test fixes
the infirmities associated with applying Tinker to off-campus internet
speech. Tinker’s substantial disruption and material interference
standard has become severely watered down because of the deference
courts give to school administrators and their determinations of what
constitutes a disruption. 270 A compelling interest test restores crucial
protection to student speech while allowing schools to regulate violent
speech, which was the justification for applying Tinker to off-campus
speech. 271 The compelling interest test eliminates the weaknesses of
Tinker while addressing the concerns behind the decision. For example,
student internet speech discussing the desire to kill a teacher could be
regulated under both Tinker and the compelling interest test in order to
prevent violence.
In contrast, speech discussing the perceived
inadequacies of a teacher in derogatory terms, which could result in
legal, professional, and ethical duty to maintain control and protect students in the school
environment.”) (citation omitted).
266. Seminski, supra note 1, at 183.
267. May, supra note 4, at 1138.
268. See Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1088 (“When it comes to digital media . . . it becomes
much more difficult to conclude that students are forced—aside from perhaps peer pressure—to view
their classmates’ speech.”); see also Williams, supra note 166, at 714 (“Unlike students gathered at an
assembly as in Fraser, student Internet users are not a captive audience.”).
269. See Papandrea, supra note 235, at 1088 (“In classrooms and at other school events students
are required to attend, they might be properly considered a ‘captive audience,’ which might warrant
some limitations on their classmates’ expressive rights that would otherwise not be tolerated.”).
270. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text.
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regulation under Tinker based on a potential disruption of the learning
environment, would be protected under the compelling interest test.
Such a test also eliminates a weakness of the true threat doctrine, which
places a high burden on the school by requiring a showing that the
student intended his speech to be a threat. 272 In the example previously
discussed, the student’s desire to kill a teacher would likely go
unregulated under the true threat analysis because the student did not
intend the speech to be a threat.
Restricting a school’s ability to punish off-campus speech pursuant to
a compelling interest also protects the education system. With the ease
of regulating speech under Tinker, a vast number of school resources
would be consumed regulating off-campus speech, placing a significant
strain on the school’s resources. 273 Without curtailing the regulation of
off-campus speech, schools are unable to focus on their primary
purpose—preparing students for citizenship and teaching them how to
thrive in republican government 274 —to the desired extent. If school
administrators focus too much on regulating speech and not on teaching
inside the classrooms, lessons will suffer.
Requiring a school to proffer a compelling interest before regulating
off-campus student speech places a check on the school’s discretion. It
also ensures that school administrators and judges, who are often out of
touch with young society, are not attempting to use the First Amendment
to create a society molded in their vision. 275 A compelling interest
standard helps bridge this generation gap by preventing such individuals
from using the First Amendment “to force-feed good manners to the
ruffians.” 276 At the same time, a compelling interest standard allows
schools to address real, violent threats to the school, which has been a
272. See May, supra note 4, at 1134–35 (“[T]o prove the student’s speech was a ‘true threat,’ a
school must provide some evidence demonstrating that the student intended and was capable of
communicating a threat.”).
273. See Pike, supra note 197, at 998.
274. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); see also Nuttall, supra
note 239, at 1318 (“Protecting children’s speech rights and encouraging their exercise is critical to the
continued vitality of a liberal democratic state.”).
275. See Li, supra note 3, at 90–91 (“Accentuating this judicial misconception is the generation
gap between judges and students—many judges do not understand popular culture and thus are unable to
grasp the student’s perspective. Two law professors have argued that judges are so generationally
removed from popular teen culture that they have difficulty understanding the culture. Instead of
recognizing that teens are immersed in this culture and are inundated with violent and profane imagery
every day, judges are focused on uncommon, tragic events like Columbine. For example, Eminem, a
popular rap artist among teenagers, has produced songs that contain ‘violent, misogynistic, and
homophobic lyrics,’ and yet he has sold millions of albums. Judges need to remember that children are
impressionable and that although their speech may at times appear crude and even violent, they are
really imitating artists such as Eminem or popular teen culture in general.”) (citations omitted).
276. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986).
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justification for applying Tinker to off-campus speech. 277
V. CONCLUSION
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court has created chaos in the
lower courts and in scholarship regarding the ability of schools to deal
with off-campus student internet speech. This chaos inhibits schools,
parents, and students from complying with the First Amendment. As a
result, student speech that falls within the protection of the First
Amendment is nonetheless being punished. Additionally, schools,
parents, and students are needlessly wasting money and time litigating
cases that could be avoided if a clear standard were readily apparent.
This Comment puts forth a new standard that addresses some of the
weaknesses created by the current state of the law. Under this proposed
standard, the initial inquiry remains the same: does the student internet
speech in question fall into the category of on-campus speech subject to
the Supreme Court’s traditional student speech jurisprudence? This
question is answered by looking at the objective intent of the student
author, which is the most speech protective mode of analysis. If the
student internet speech cannot objectively be considered on-campus
speech, it is off-campus speech and presumptively protected by the First
Amendment. A student’s off-campus internet speech can be punished
by the school in two ways. First, the school can punish speech that is
traditionally unprotected by the First Amendment. Second, the school
can punish speech if the school can articulate a compelling interest that
outweighs the student’s interest in freedom of speech. This new
approach enables school districts to prevent violence on their campuses
by monitoring student internet speech, but also ensures that parental and
student rights are not violated. In the presence of chaos, this approach
adequately balances the interests of all parties involved.

277. See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text.
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